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Recent Cases
INSANITY DEFENSE-COMMONWEALTH MUST PRE-
SENT EVIDENCE OF SANITY IF DEFENDANT
CHARGED WITH MURDER PRESENTS
EVIDENCE OF INSANITY
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
On August 1, 1962, the defendant, Dennis Vogel, shot and
killed a store manager and his secretary during the course of an
armed robbery. At his trial, the defendant was found guilty of
robbery and two counts of murder in the second degree.1 The de-
fendant pleaded insanity as his defense. During the trial, three
well-qualified psychiatrists testified that the defendant was legally
insane at the time of the alleged murders and robbery. 2 The de-
fendant also introduced various lay witnesses, who testified that
his often bizarre conduct led them to believe that he was insane.
3
1. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 4, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
2. Id. at 6, 268 A.2d at 92.
3. Id. at 25, 268 A.2d at 98 (dissenting opinion). Some examples of
this conduct are as follows:
(1) while in his early teens standing on a small hill near his par-
ent's home, he had thrown rocks at the front door for several
hours, not allowing anyone to enter or leave the premises; (2) he
was expelled from school because of his continued disruption of
the classroom; (3) he screamed and yelled, in response to his fa-
ther's offer to take him hunting, you keep away from me, or you
are liable to find a stray bullet, too, up in the woods; (4) he con-
stantly kept the door of his bedroom locked and would stare at the
floor for hours at a time; (5) after accompanying his father to Mass,
he began. to yell profane words at Mass, for no explained reason;
(6) he woke his wife in the middle of the night and asked her to
make cereal for him and, after she complied with his request and
he had eaten the cereal, he beat her because he said the cereal
"The Commonwealth offered no direct evidence which either re-
butted or impeached any of the testimony as to Vogel's insanity."4
The Commonwealth relied upon evidence of the defendant's situ-
ation and actions before, during, and after the alleged murders,5
and upon the presumption of sanity.6
The defendant appealed his conviction on three grounds.
The first issue arose from the fact that the trial judge sentenced
him to life imprisonment on the second count of murder by re-
lying upon the Act of June 24, 1939,7 which provides:
Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the
second degree is guilty of a felony, and shall, for the first
offense, be sentenced to undergo imprisonment by sepa-
rate or solitary confinement not exceeding twenty (20)
years, or fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or
both, and for the second offense, shall undergo imprison-
ment for the period of his natural life.8
The defendant contended that the words "second offense" re-
ferred to a murder unrelated to the first murder. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that a "second murder" means a mur-
der "committed after a conviction for a prior murder, and which
was not part of the same transaction or occurrence which led to
the first murder."9 Therefore, the sentence of life imprisonment
imposed on the second count of murder was incorrect.
The second issue arose because the defendant "urged that the
made him sick-then he professed undying love for her; (7) he
asked his wife to make hot tea for him and, after waiting for the
tea to get cold before drinking it, beat her for making him cold
tea; (8) he played war games with M&M candies--on one occasion
his wife "reached down and grabbed . . . and popped an M&M in
[her] mouth, . . . [he] got furious at [her] because it 'was not
dead' yet; and (9) he had various other flights into imaginary
worlds.
Id.
4. 440 Pa. at 6, 268 A.2d at 92.
5. Some of these situations and actions are as follows:
Defendant's prior threats to kill the deceased Atwood [the manager
of the store]; his debts and financial problems; the day before the
killing he was seen across the street looking over the Grant store;
the acts took place after 12 o'clock noon after the store was
closed; after the killings ransacking the safe, taking over $800 in
cash and taking Mrs. Rechel's pocketbook, and other items from
the store; throwing away a .22 calibre revolver purchased by him
sometime before the killings; within an hour after the crime
fleeing with his wife and child to Canada; warning his wife not
to look into the trunk where he had placed most of the stolen
items; as the police were coming into the restaurant in Canada
where he and his wife had gone to eat, attempting to pass a large
roll of bills to his wife and when she refused to take it, to place
it in her blouse.
Id. at 7, 268 A.2d at 92.
6. Id. at 6, 268 A.2d at 92.
7. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
8. Id.
9. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 8, 268 A.2d 89, 93 (1970);
cf. Commonwealth v. Swingle, 403 Pa. 293, 169 A.2d 871 (1961); Common-
wealth ex rel. Swingle v. Banmiller, 398 Pa. 43, 156 A.2d 520 (1959).
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
prosecution should have had the burden of proving sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt, as a fact necessary to constitute the crime of
murder."' 0 The Court refused to adopt such a rule of law. It re-
tained the prior Pennsylvania rule that the burden is upon the de-
fendant to prove his insanity "by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence.""
The third issue presented what the Court believed was a
question of first impression in Pennsylvania.' 2 The Court phrased
the issue as follows:
[M]ay one be convicted of murder, even though the
Commonwealth, relying on the legal presumption of san-
ity, presents no direct evidence to contradict or impeach
the testimony of witnesses, lay and expert, who un-
equivocally testify that at the time of the homicide, the
accused was legally insane within the definition of legal
insanity under the M'Naughten rule?"3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a defendant
could not be convicted under such circumstances. It said that once
the defendant presents evidence of insanity which is sufficient or
adequate to prove legal insanity, the presumption drops out. After
that, the Commonwealth must present some evidence of sanity to
obtain a conviction.
The judgments of sentence were vacated, and defendant Vogel
was granted a new trial. Three different opinions were given in
support of the order per curiam granting a new trial.
Mr. Justice Jones, joined by Mr. Justice O'Brien, filed the
opinion which disposed of the three issues mentioned earlier in
this Note. Because the justices joining in this opinion were in the
majority of those favoring reversal of the conviction, their deci-
sion on the second issue in Vogel sustains Pennsylvania's earlier
position on the burden of proof in insanity defenses. Their opin-
ion also presents Pennsylvania's newly expressed position on the
status of the presumption of sanity, and the action required of the
Commonwealth once the defendant causes the presumption to drop
from the case.
In considering the defendant's second contention-that the
prosecution should have the burden of proving the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-the majority opinion recognized
10. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 8, 268 A.2d 89, 93 (1970).
11. Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 199, 85 A.2d 391, 395
(1952).
12. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 12, 268 A.2d 89, 95 (1970).
13. Id.
that there are several views14 as to the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to rebut the presumption of sanity.
The federal courts require that the prosecution prove the de-
fendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue is prop-
erly raised.15 "The issue of sanity is treated as an element of the
crime which the prosecution must prove once the question of san-
ity is contested.""' Many state courts also take this position.
17
Another rule, applied in Pennsylvania and many other
states,1 8 is that the defendant has the burden of proving his san-
ity "by a fair preponderance of the evidence." '19 This rule follows
the rationale that:
[S] anity is not an element of the crime, but, rather, in-
volves the ability to understand and comprehend the right
and the wrong of the commission of the crime, a state
of mentality which would render punishment . . . futile
and would require confinement of the defendant for treat-
ment rather than for punishment.
20
Under the M'Naughten Rule, which is the law in Pennsyl-
vania, a person may be legally insane if he is incapable of realiz-
ing what he is doing, or if he cannot judge whether his act is right or
wrong.2 ' In Vogel, the prosecution presented evidence that the
defendant knew what he was doing; but it presented no evidence
as to whether he realized his acts were right or wrong.
After considering all the above factors, the majority reached
its decision and declined to adopt the federal rule as to the burden
of proving sanity or insanity. It said that the "burden remains on
14. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968).
15. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); Davis v. United
States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
16. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 9, 268 A.2d 89, 93 (1970).
17. E.g., State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967); Castro
v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); State v. Joseph, 96 Conn. 637,
115 A. 85 (1921); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); People
v. Jenko, 410 Ill. 478, 102 N.E.2d 783 (1951); Whitaker v. State, 240 Ind. 676,
168 N.E.2d 212 (1960); State v. Penry, 189 Kan. 243, 368 P.2d 60 (1962);
Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 206 A.2d 802 (1965); Commonwealth v.
Soaris, 275 Mass. 291, 175 N.E. 491 (1931); People v. Eggleston, 186 Mich.
510, 152 N.W. 944 (1915); Gambrell v. State, 238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758
(1960).
18. E.g., Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 142 So. 2d 899 (1962); Kelley v.
State, 154 Ark. 246, 242 S.W. 572 (1922); People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288,
363 P.2d 865 (1961); Ross v. State, 217 Ga. 569, 124 S.E.2d 280 (1962); State
v. Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 114 N.W.2d 526 (1962); Feree v. Commonwealth,
193 Ky. 347, 236 S.W. 246 (1922); State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So. 2d 315
(1955); State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963); State v. Finn, 257
Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960); State v. DeHaan, 88 Mont. 407, 292 P. 1109
(1930); State v. Behiter, 55 Nev. 236, 29 P.2d 1000 (1934).
19. Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 199, 85 A.2d 391, 395
(1952).
20. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 10, 268 A.2d 89, 94 (1970).
21. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
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the defendant to prove his insanity by a fair perponderance of the
evidence."
'22
As to the third issue in Vogel, the court held that the convic-
tion would have to be reversed because the Commonwealth did
not offer any affirmative evidence that the defendant had been able
to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the mur-
ders. It stated that the Commonwealth "merely established the
circumstances of the crime and the events leading to the appre-
hension of the defendant.123 Thus, the verdicts were not sup-
ported by the evidence and had to be set aside.
24
The Court was correct in saying that this was an issue of
first impression in Pennsylvania. An examination of previous
cases25 shows that there has almost always been affirmative evi-
dence of sanity produced by the Commonwealth. This evidence
has consisted of psychiatric or lay testimony as to the defendant's
sanity. Thus, there has been little opportunity for the issue of
the Commonwealth's duty to arise once the presumption of sanity
is rebutted. However, Comnnwealth v. Heller26 is one prior case
in which it does appear that a conviction for murder was sustained
even though the Commonwealth presented no affirmative evidence
to contradict the defendant's evidence of insanity. Probably, the
reason the sentence was not reversed in Heller is that defense coun-
sel did not raise the issue of the Commonwealth's duty to present
some evidence of sanity after the presumption of sanity was re-
butted. Or, quite possibly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did
not believe the evidence of insanity was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of sanity.
27
According to the Vogel majority, the Commonwealth had no
right to rely on the presumption of sanity after the defendant pre-
sented evidence which contradicted the presumption. The court
22. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 11, 268 A.2d 89, 95 (1970).
23. Id. at 12, 268 A.2d at 95.
24. See Commonwealth v. Hazlett, 429 Pa. 476, 240 A.2d 555 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Radford, 428 Pa. 279, 236 A.2d 802 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Tabb, 417 Pa. 13, 207 A.2d 884 (1965).
25. E.g., Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534
(1964); Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A.2d 391 (1952).
26. 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952).
27. In Heller, the Court said:
If, therefore, it be true as obviously it is that Opinion evidence is
not entitled to much weight against positive testimon2y of actual
facts, defendant's actions in the present case, speaking louder than
his words, wholly refute the opinion evidence of the expert medi-
cal witness, vague and inadequate as it was to establish what the
law regards as exculpatory insanity. Everything that defendant
did both immediately before and immediately after he killed his
has been unwilling to base a verdict solely on a presumption, once
it is contradicted by credible evidence,28 since the "function of a
presumption is to reach a presumed conclusion of fact, in the ab-
sence of credible evidence to the contrary.
' '29
In summarizing the majority opinion in Vogel, it can be seen
that the decision places very little extra burden on the Common-
wealth in a murder case. Once the defendant presents evidence
sufficient to prove legal insanity, and the presumption of sanity
drops out, the Commonwealth need only present "some evidence
to substantiate the conclusion that he was legally sane"30 to pre-
sent a case for the jury's determination. This is a technicality
which the Commonwealth can overcome by presenting credible
lay testimony or circumstantial evidence as to the defendant's san-
ity.
Mr. Justice Roberts filed an opinion in support of the order
per curiam. He agreed that, in a murder trial, the prosecution
could originally rely on the presumption of sanity; and, if the de-
fendant offers evidence that he is not sane, the presumption should
drop out. That portion of his opinion is in accord with that of
Justices Jones and O'Brien on the third issue in Vogel. However,
Mr. Justice Roberts differed with the majority as to what the law
should be after the presumption drops out. He reasoned that the
act of murder must be coupled with the required mens rea.3 1
Since intent is an element of the crime, the capacity to form that
intent must also be an element of the crime.3 2 Therefore, sanity
should be treated as an element of the crime. After the presump-
tion of sanity drops out, the Commonwealth should have the bur-
den of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt,3 as it must do
with all other elements of the crime.
Mr. Justice Pomeroy also filed an opinion in support of the
order per curiam. He agreed with the majority decision on the
third issue in Vogel. That is, he agreed that the presumption of san-
ity is of initial value to the Commonwealth, but that the presump-
tion drops out 34 once the defendant offers evidence of insanity suf-
ficient to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. How-
wife shows that he was in perfect possession of his senses, and the
jury was well justified in not accepting his own statement that just
for the few minutes required in which to perpetrate the killing he
was mentally irresponsible and had no consciousness of what he
was doing.
Id. at 462, 87 A.2d at 289.
28. Allison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861
(1967); see Commonwealth v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41 A.2d 574 (1945).
29. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 13-14, 268 A.2d 89, 96 (1970)
citing Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
30. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 13, 268 A.2d 89, 95 (1970).
31. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1868).
32. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964).
33. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
34. See Allison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861
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ever, he said that once the presumption has dropped out, the burden
of proof of sanity should rest with the Commonwealth. Unlike
Mr. Justice Roberts, he said that this burden could be met by any
competent evidence, including circumstantial evidence. Mr. Jus-
tice Pomeroy said that there was no "circumstantial evidence [in
Vogel] which tended to prove legal sanity, as distinguished from
intent or design to carry out the robbery in the course of which the
homicide occurred.
'5
Mr. Chief Justice Bell, joined by Mr. Justice Eagen, filed a dis-
senting opinion.36 This opinion agreed with the majority statement
that when sufficient or adequate evidence is introduced to prove
legal insanity, the presumption of sanity should drop out. It also
agreed with the majority's disposition of the second issue, that the
burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
rests with the defendant.
However, the dissent maintained that the jury should be able to
return a guilty verdict even if the Commonwealth presents no
direct evidence of sanity. Since a jury can convict a defendant
on circumstantial evidence alone,3 7 such evidence of the defen-
dant's acts before, during and after the crime should be sufficient
to contradict any direct evidence of insanity which the defendant
might present. This viewpoint is bolstered by the rule that the
credibility of a witness is for the jury's determination,38 which
should be free to disbelieve any testimony supporting a defen-
dant's insanity plea.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Vogel decision will have
little effect on trials in which an insanity defense is entered.
The defendant must still present sufficient evidence to prove legal
insanity. "It is incumbent upon him to establish the alleged de-
(1967); Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958); Waters
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 393 Pa. 247, 144 A.2d 254 (1958); Commonwealth
v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41 A.2d 574 (1945); Geho's Estate, 340 Pa. 412,
17 A.2d 342 (1941); Szmahl's Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A.2d 342 (1939); Watkins
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934).
35. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 21, 268 A.2d 89, 104 (1970).
36. Id. at 21, 268 A.2d at 96 (dissenting opinion).
37. See Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Hart, 403 Pa. 652, 170 A.2d 850 (1961); Commonwealth v. Boden,
399 Pa. 298, 159 A.2d 894 (1960); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500,
113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344,
106 A.2d 587 (1954); Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. 504, 31 A.2d 95
(1943); Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 195 A. 62 (1937).
38. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d 734 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Chambers, 367 Pa. 159, 79 A.2d 201 (1951).
fective mental condition by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
. . . Throughout the issue remains one of fact for the jury to de-
termine."80  Only after the presumption of sanity drops out need
the Commonwealth do anything to prove the defendant's sanity.
Then, the Commonwealth can meet the requirements of Vogel and
get its case to the jury by introducing some evidence of sanity, even
if that evidence is only circumstantial. Just what "circumstantial"
evidence of sanity (knowledge of the difference between right
and wrong) is sufficient is a question which could cause some
problems. The Commonwealth can avoid any such difficulty by
introducing some lay or psychiatric evidence of sanity.
The Vogel decision did not overrule any prior decisions, be-
cause the issue as to the Commonwealth's duty after the presump-
tion of sanity drops out has never been litigated before in Penn-
sylvania. Although the technical legal validity of the Vogel deci-
sion may be debatable, it is submitted that its impact on the cur-
rent procedure in criminal cases will be negligible.
LAnY J. FOLmAR
39. Commonwealth v. Carlucetti, 369 Pa. 190, 199, 85 A.2d 391, 395
(1952) citing Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 68, 178 A. 823, 825
(1935).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
AUTOMOBILES PURSUANT TO PROBABLE CAUSE
Chambers v. Maroney, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970)
In Chambers v. Maroney,' the Supreme Court of the United
States clarified the existing doctrines on the warrantless search
of automobiles pursuant to probable cause as distinguished from
a search incident to arrest. The Court held that the warrantless
search of an automobile, after it had been removed to a police
station, was not violative of the fourth amendment prohibitions
against unreasonable searches2 when the search was grounded on
the theory of probable cause. The decision underscores the
existence of two distinct theories for the warrantless search of
motor vehicles-a search incident to arrest and a search on pro-
bable cause.
Petitioner Frank Chambers was indicted and convicted of the
robbery of two gasoline service stations in western Pennsylvania.'
His conviction arose from the following facts. In May, 1963 the
petitioner and three companions riding in a light blue compact
station wagon were apprehended by police following the rob-
bery of a service station approximately two miles away. The four
men were stopped on the basis of information received from two
teen-agers who were near the scene of the robbery and a descrip-
tion of the robbers obtained from the service station attendant.
4
Petitioner and his three companions were arrested and the car
in which they were riding was driven to a police station.5 In the
course of a thorough, but warrantless, search of the car at the police
station authorities discovered incriminating evidence linking pe-
titioner with the robbery under investigation and also a previous
1. 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970), affg, 408 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1969).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The fourth amendment was applied to prohibit the use of evidence ob-
tained by unconstitutional search and seizures in state courts in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1978 (1970).
4. Id. at 1977.
5. Id.
service station robbery in the area.6 The following day police ob-
tained further evidence in a warrant-authorized search of petition-
er's home. 7 The various materials removed from the station wagon
were introduced into evidence at petitioner's trial. On appeal, pe-
titioner contended that the warrantless search of the automobile at
the police station after his arrest was a violation of his fourth
amendment rights. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found no
violation of petitioner's fourth amendment rights.8 The Supreme
Court affirmed.
The Court was squarely faced with an issue it had hereto-
fore been able to avoid answering-whether a motor vehicle ori-
ginally stopped on grounds of probable cause could later be the
object of a warrantless search after it had been removed from the
public highway.9
In reaching its decision the Court quickly disposed of the con-
tention that the search of the automobile was a valid warrantless
search incident to arrest. Writing the opinion for the majority
of the Court, Mr. Justice White first noted that petitioner's arrest
was valid:
Having talked to the teen-age observers and to the victim
Kovacich, the police had ample cause to stop a light blue
compact station wagon carrying four men and to arrest
the occupants, one of whom was wearing a green sweater
and one of whom had a trench coat with him in the car.10
Notwithstanding the validity of petitioner's arrest, the subsequent
search of the automobile at the police station was properly held
not to be a search incident to arrest:
Even so, the search which produced the incriminating evi-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 408 F.2d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1969).
9. The Court had been faced with the problem of a car being
searched at a later time after arrest in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964) and in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
In Preston, the defendant and two companions were arrested for vagrancy
after police observed them in a parked car. The vehicle in which the de-
fendant was observed was removed to the police station and later to a
garage, where it was thoroughly searched by police without a warrant. The
search produced incriminating evidence which led to defendant's convic-
tion of conspiracy to rob a federally-insured bank. The defendant ap-
pealed his conviction, alleging the evidence introduced at his trial was the
product of an unconstitutional search and seizure, and, therefore, inadmis-
sible. The government contended that the search was justified as a search
incident to arrest. The Court held that the search was too remote in time
and place to have been made as a search incident to arrest. The Court
also noted that there was not probable cause to search the vehicle. In
Dyke, the Court held that the warrantless search of defendant's car, fol-
lowing his arrest for reckless driving, was unconstitutional where the
search did not take place until the defendants "were in custody inside the
courthouse and the car was parked on the street outside." 391 U.S. 216,
222 (1968). The Court held that the search was not incident to arrest nor
could it be sustained on probable cause grounds.
10. 90 S. Ct. at 1979.
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dence was made at the police station sometime after the
arrest and cannot be justified as a search incident to ar-
rest: 'once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then
a search made at another place, without a warrant, is
simply not incident to arrest.' Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367. . . . [T]he reasons which have been
thought sufficient to justify warrantless searches carried
out in connection with an arrest no longer obtain when the
accused is safely in custody at the station house."'
Under the existing doctrine of search incident to arrest, a
law enforcement officer may engage in the warrantless search of
the person of the arrestee and of the area of his immediate con-
trol.12 The reasons for allowing such a warrantless search are
based on the contingencies of the situation immediately following
the arrest of a person. The reasons referred to by Mr. Justice
White in the majority opinion were earlier set forth by Mr. Justice
Black in Preston v. United States: "3
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified,
for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things
which might be used to assault an officer or effect an es-
cape, as well as to prevent the destruction of evidence of
the crime-things which might well happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under
his immediate control. But these justifications are absent
where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.'
4
The recent case of Chimel v. California5 amplifies the rationale
behind a warrantless search incident to arrest. The Supreme Court
expressly delineated the proper bounds of a search incident to
arrest and limited such search to that reasonably necessary for the
protection of police, and prevention of destruction of evidence. In
Chimel the Court held that the warrantless search of an accused's
house following his arrest was unreasonable and violative of the
accused's fourth amendment rights. Writing the opinion of the
Court, Mr. Justice Stewart noted:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or to effect escape .... In addition, it is en-
tirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order
to prevent its concealment. And the area into which an
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
13. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
14. Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
15. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or eviden-
tiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
• . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search
of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immedi-
ate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
16
It is obvious that after the accused is taken into custody the ra-
tionale used to support a warrantless search incident to arrest
ceases to exist. If the arrestee is placed into a squad car or other-
wise removed from his own vehicle the danger of his obtaining a
weapon or destroying evidence in the car is minimal.
As the Court indicated in a footnote in Chambers, even in
the absence of a valid search incident to arrest, there is yet another
basis for allowing a warrantless search of an automobile-a search
based upon probable cause.17 The development of a search on
probable cause may be traced to the Prohibition case of Carroll v.
United States.' In Carroll, two whiskey runners were con-
victed of violating the National Prohibition Act. The defendants ap-
pealed their conviction on the ground that the whiskey and gin in-
troduced into evidence at their trial was the product of an un-
constitutional search and seizure in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. The car in which the bootleggers were riding was stopped
and searched by government agents as it was being driven along a
public highway. The agents found sixty-eight bottles of scotch
whiskey and Gordon gin behind the upholstering of the seats.19
The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, rejected the
bootleggers' contentions and held that the search and seizure was
not violative of the fourth amendment:
On reason and authority the rule is that if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of the circumstances known to the seizing officer,
that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and
seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the in-
terests and rights of individual citizens.
20
The Court then recounted a lengthy survey of the law of
search and seizure in the United States and Mr. Chief Justice
Taft expressed the holding of the Court in the following manner:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to
these statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from
16. Id. at 762-63.
17. 90 S. Ct. at 1979 n.6.
18. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
19. Id. at 135-36.
20. Id. at 149.
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unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amend-
ment has been construed, practically since the beginning
of government, as recognizing a necessary difference be-
tween a search of a store, dwelling house or other struc-
ture in respect of which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon
or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not prac-
ticable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
21
The Court, therefore, held that because of the extingencies of the
situation it was permissible to search an automobile without a
warrant when the search was grounded on probable cause.
22
In Chambers, the Court relied heavily on the precepts of Car-
roll in support of its rationale that a search on probable cause
may be distinguished from a search incident to arrest. Mr. Justice
White noted that the Court continues to distinguish between the
search of homes and the search of automobiles.23 In considering
the warrantless search of an automobile the benchmark of proba-
ble cause, suggested by Carroll, is the applicable standard to be ap-
plied.24 The Court reaffirmed that a search on probable cause
flows from an entirely separate theory than that of a search inci-
dent to arrest, 25 but recognized that the facts which may give rise
to probable cause would be the same facts which would support
a valid arrest.
26
The Court had little trouble in finding probable cause to sup-
port the warrantless search of the car in which petitioner was
riding, thus distinguishing Chambers from earlier warrantless car
search cases. 27 The Court stated:
Here the situation is different, for the police had probable
cause to believe that the robbers, carrying guns and fruits
of the crime, had fled the scene in a light blue compact
station wagon which would be carrying four men, one wear-
ing a green sweater and another wearing a trench coat.
[T]here was probable cause to arrest the occupants of
the station wagon that the officers stopped, just as ob-
viously was there probable cause to search the car for
guns and stolen money.28
21. Id. at 153 (emphasis supplied).
22. Id. at 161-62.
23. 90 S. Ct. at 1979.
24. Id. at 1980.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1979 n.6.
27. See, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), discussed at note 9 supra.
28. 90 S. Ct. at 1979.
Although the minimum requirement of probable cause was satis-
fied, the Court in Chambers faced yet another hurdle in sustaining
the warrantless search. Carroll held that an automobile may be
searched on probable cause when stopped along a highway; it did
not decide whether a later search of the car at a police station or
garage is also constitutionally permissible. In other words Carroll
permits immediate search of a stopped vehicle on probable cause.
But Chambers involved the search of a motor vehicle at the police
station after the petitioner and his companions were in custody
and after the vehicle was removed from the scene of the arrest.
When faced with the problem of later searches of automobiles
which had been originally stopped along highways, the Court, in
two previous cases, had avoided answering the issue by deciding
the cases on other grounds. 29 The Court in the present case, how-
ever, declined to distinguish between an immediate search of a
motor vehicle on probable cause, and a later search of a motor ve-
hicle when an immediate search would have been constitutionally
permissible.
The Court noted that there were few alternatives open to
police when they had probable cause to search a motor vehicle.
The vehicle could, of course, be searched immediately at the site
of stoppage, but such a search, in the Court's opinion, may be
frought with impracticalities. 80 Or, it would be necessary to seize
the car, and hold it without a warrant until a search warrant
could be obtained.31 In grappling with the issue Mr. Justice White
noted that probable cause is a minimum requirement for a rea-
sonable search.3 2 He further noted that the Constitution
required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable
cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a search
is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment
of police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient autho-
rization for a search.
3 3
The Court carefully premised its discussion on the standard that
not every search, even with probable cause, may be made "without
the extra protection for privacy which a warrant affords. '3 4 The
Court then considered the possible argument that while seizing
the automobile until a search warrant was obtained constituted
an invasion of privacy, it was a lesser intrusion which was permis-
sible until the magistrate authorized a greater intrusion, (i.e. search
of the car). 35 The Court rejected the argument:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between
29. See discussion at note 9 supra.
30. 90 S. Ct. at 1981 n.9.







on the one hand seizing and holding a car before pre-
senting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without
a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
3 6
The Court then concluded that since there was probable cause to
search the car at the scene,
the probable cause factor still obtained at the station
house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless search of the car and
denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In
that event there is little to choose in terms of practical
consequences between an immediate search without a war-
rant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is ob-
tained.1
7
In Chambers the later search at the police station was held to be
reasonable under the circumstances. 38 The Court also summarily
dismissed petitioner's contention that he was not afforded effective
assistance of counsel.
9
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part
from the majority opinion. In considering the probable cause the-
ory used by the majority to sustain the search of the car at the
police station, Mr. Justice Harlan expressed concern over the
Court's treatment of Carroll. He also falted the Court for de-
parting from its previous pronouncement that "a search without
a warrant is not justified by the mere knowledge by the searching
officers of facts showing probable cause."40
Justice Harlan contended that the only exceptions to the re-
quirement of obtaining a search warrant before engaging in a search
were carved out of the general requirement to meet particular
circumstances. 41 After agreeing that an immediate search was
constitutionally permissible under Carroll, Mr. Justice Harlan
recognized that police must take certain measures to prevent the
destruction of evidence and to make a search possible. Justice
Harlan criticized his brethern for the latitude of permissible
measures allotted police:
The Court holds that those steps include making a warrant-
less search of the entire vehicle on the highway-a conclu-




39. Id. at 1982.
40. Id. at 1986.
41. Id.
-and indeed appears to go further and to condone the
removal of the car to the police station for a warrantless
search there at the convenience of the police. I cannot
agree that this result is consistent with our insistence
in other areas that departures from the warrant require-
ment strictly conform to the exigency presented.
42
Mr. Justice Harlan indicated that the better method would be
for the police to seize the vehicle until a search warrant is ob-
tained, since "such a course would fully protect the interests of ef-
fective law enforcement. ' 43 While such a course of action does,
nonetheless, infringe on an individual's fourth amendment rights,
Mr. Justice Harlan reasoned that a warrantless search involved
"the greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values. '"4 4  He con-
cluded:
The Court now discards the approach taken in Preston,
and creats a special rule for automobile searches that is
seriously at odds with generally applied Fourth Amend-
ment principles.
45
Chambers v. Maroney4G represents an expansion of the exist-
ing view of warrantless searches of motor vehicles. Chambers
authorizes a search of a motor vehicle without a warrant when
the traditional justifications of warrantless searches of cars have
ceased to exist. Chambers does serve to clarify the existing sepa-








46. 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970).
47. Chambers also serves to clarify some confusion on the application
of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), to the search of motor vehicles.
In subsequent decisions the Court reversed with per curiam opinions lower
courts which found constitutional violations when there was not a valid
search incident to arrest, but sufficient facts to support a search on prob-
able cause. See, e.g., Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969),
vacated, 90 S. Ct. 2233 (1970); Woods v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1969
vacated, 90 S. Ct. 2234 (1970). Both Colosimo and Woods were vacated
with a simple citation to Chambers.
WARRANTY-PENNSYLVANIA ALLOWS CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST
HOSPITAL FOR TRANSFUSION OF BLOOD
CONTAINING SERUM HEPATITIS
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hoffman v. Miseri-
cordia Hospital' refused to close the door on the possibility of
holding a hospital strictly liable for the transfusion of blood2 con-
taining serum hepatitis.3
On May 2, 1967, plaintiff's decedent, Margaret Sullivan, was
admitted as a maternity patient to defendant Hospital. From that
time until her discharge eight days later, the decedent received
several blood transfusions due to postnatal complications. The
blood had been obtained, at least in part, from the defendant's own
blood bank. On June 29, 1967, the decedent died. Plaintiff, the
administrator of the estate, filed his complaint in assumpsit alleg-
ing that death had been caused by serum hepatitis contained in
the transfused blood.4 The complaint, later amended, further al-
leged that the transfusions had constituted a sale of the blood to
the decedent by the Hospital thus giving rise to the implied warran-
ties of merchantibility5 and of fitness for the particular purpose.6
A breach of both warranties was claimed as the basis for plaintiff's
cause of action.
The defendant Hospital filed preliminary objections to the
amended complaint in the form of a demurrer, 7 contending that
1. 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
2. For introductory material on blood transfusions see 11 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTs Transfusions 331 (1961).
3. For introductory material on hepatitis see 14 AM. JuR. PROOF OF
FACTS Hepatitis §§ 1-38 (1964).
4. The complaint also sought recovery from the American Red Cross
which had supplied some of the blood that was used by the Hospital.
However, this appeal does not involve that party: Brief for Plaintiff at 4.
The amended complaint also sought recovery from the National Blood
Services of Philadelphia, Inc., but this party was subsequently dropped
from the case when it was discovered that blood supplied to the Hospital
by that party had been transfused to the deceased only after she had con-
tracted hepatitis: Brief for Plaintiff at 3 n.1.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (1962), codified in Pennsyl-
vania as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314 (1970).
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 (1962), codified in Pennsyl-
vania as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-315 (1970).
7. PA. R. Civ. P.' 1017(b) (4) (1970 Supp.).
the complaint did not state a cause of action. The Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Trial Division of Philadelphia Country, sustained the
preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. From that or-
der, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
That court, with one dissenting voice on July 2, 1970, reversed the
trial court's order of dismissal and remanded the cause of action.8
The issue presented in the Hoffman case-whether or not a
hospital is liable for breach of implied warranty as a result of
transfusing blood containing serum hepatitis-was one of first
impression in the appellate courts of PennsylvaniaY However, the
problem has been faced in several other jurisdictions.' 0 The Hoff-
man opinion correctly, although somewhat misleadingly, summa-
rizes the results of these other cases by observing that "none has
so far explicitly determined that a hospital is liable for such an
occurrence."" The statement is misleading in that there have
been two recent decisions which, while not "explicitly" holding the
hospital liable for the furnishing of "bad blood" at least have paved
the way for the future imposition of strict liability on a hospital
given the proper fact situation.12 The Illinois and New Jersey
8. The decision was split 6-1 with Chief Justice Bell the lone dis-
senter. Mr. Justice Eagen wrote the majority opinion.
9. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 504, 267 A.2d 867,
868 (1970).
10. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964);
White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968);
Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967); Lovett v. Emory Univ.,
Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Cunningham v. MacNeal Me-
morial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 39 U.S.L.W.
2200 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1970); Balkowitsch v. Minnesota War Memorial Blood
Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965) (dictum); Jackson v. Muh-
lenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), rev'd. on other
grounds 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308
N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733,
304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48
Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc.,
23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
11. 439 Pa. 501, 504, 267 A.2d 867, 868 (1970) (emphasis added).
12. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 13 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251
N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 39 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1970): a valid
cause of action was held to have been stated for strict liability in tort and
through the use of strong dictum, the court stated that a similar claim
for breach of implied warranty, had it been pleaded, would have also been
held to be valid; Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d
879 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969): although
the Superior Court of New Jersey held, inter alia, that no implied warranty
had been breached, it was because such warranty had been effectively dis-
claimed. Thus, by implication, the court recognized the existence of the
warranty. For a full discussion of this phase of the decision see Alter and
Haut, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rsv. 557, 570
(1969). On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and re-
manded the entire proceedings to trial. The intention of the court in rein-
stating the warranty cause of action is not clear-whether it meant to
register its disapproval with the potential imposition of strict liability on
the hospital or whether it wanted the case decided on broader policy con-
siderations that could only be properly developed at trial and that had
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courts could not rule definitively on the issue of ultimate liability
or non-liability of the hospital because the respective procedural
issues-the former, an appeal from a dismissal of the complaint,
13
and the latter, an appeal from a summary judgment14-- did not
permit such a final determination at that stage. In other words,
all that a decision adverse to the hospital meant in those two cases
was that the record would be remanded to the lower court for
trial. Likewise, the decision in Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital15
does not mean that the Hospital, by virtue of this decision, was
held strictly liable for the transfusion of the impure blood. What
it does mean is that the case was remanded for trial and, providing
that the plaintiff can prove at trial the allegations of his complaint
(such as causation and reliance on the warranty), strict liability
can be imposed on the Hospital.
Other than the two cases referred to above, all other attempts
prior to Hoffman to impose strict liability on a hospital, 16 whether
they be in tort17 or in warranty, 8 for transfusing to a patient
blood containing serum hepatitis have been unsuccessful. 9 Breach
of implied warranty has been the most frequently used line of at-
not been before the Superior Court of New Jersey. Both arguments are
thoroughly discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions of Baptista v.
St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (1970).
13. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251
N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 39 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1970).
14. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
15. 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
16. Attempts to impose strict liability on commercial blood banks
have been more successful than in the case of hospitals. See e.g., Carter
v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1969).
17. While most litigation in the area of strict liability for transfusion
of "bad blood" has been in the warranty area, several cases have utilized
the tort concepts of strict liability embodied in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113
Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 39 U.S.L.W. 2200 (111. Sept.
29, 1970); Balkowitsch v. Minnesota War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270
Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J.
Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d
65 (1969). The application of strict liability in tort to blood transfusion
cases is thoroughly discussed in Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospitals' Lia-
bility for Hepatitis-Contaminated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Lia-
bility, 48 Cm. BAR REC. 204 (1967). From the overall success of hospitals
in defending against both warranty and tort actions, it is apparent that
courts have not demonstrated a preference for either of the two theories.
18. The overlapping of strict liability in tort and of strict liability in
warranty in the products liability field is analyzed in Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965).
19. See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 768 (1958).
tack. It was first attempted in the landmark case of Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital,20 decided in 1954. Therein, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, in dismissing the warranty provisions of plain-
tiff's complaint, denied the patient recovery on the theory that the
hospital's act of transfusing blood to a patient was only incident-
ally a sale of that blood and was predominately a service to which
concepts of sale, specifically implied warranties, do not apply."
Because the sale was merely a minor incident of the whole trans-
action, the implied warranties of the Uniform Sales Act,22 in effect
at that time in New York, were held not to have attached.
23
There has been prolific adverse commentary on the Perlmutter
reasoning.24 Such criticism, however, has been disregarded, for
the most part, as the various courts have instead chosen to adopt
the web of protection spun around hospitals by the Perlmutter
logic. 25 But, a few jurisdictions have rejected this sale-service
distinction26 as being an overly artificial basis upon which to jus-
tify a decision. 27 By its opinion in Hoffman, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has joined this minority that has expressly rejected
Perlmutter.2 Noting that the lower court had sustained the de-
murrer of the Hospital on the authority of Perlmutter, the court
held that it was error for the lower court to have done so:
We therefore do not feel obligated to hinge any resolu-
tion of the very important issue here raised on the tech-
nical existence of a sale. In this respect, we agree with
the following statement made by a court of a sister state:
'It seems to us a distortion to take what is at least ar-
20. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
21. Id.
22. UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 15(1), 15(2) (1906) (superseded by the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE).
23. New York did not adopt the UNIFORmo COMMERCIAL CODE until
1962, effective September 27, 1964.
24. Alter and Haut, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST.
JoiN's L. REV. 305 (1969); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in
Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957); Garibaldi, A New Look at
Hospitals' Liability for Hepatitis-Contaminated Blood on Principles of
Strict Tort Liability, 48 CHI. BAR REC. 204 (1967); 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 831
(1970); 69 HARV. L. REv. 391 (1955); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 565 (1962); 18
OKI.& L. Rsv. 104 (1965); 29 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 305 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REV.
833 (1955). Contra, Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DICK. L. REv. 201 (1969).
25. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964);
White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968);
Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc.,
116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc.
2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist.,
48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center,
Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
26. For a discussion of the problems arising when elements of both a
sale and a service are present in the same transaction, see Comment,
Sale of Goods in Service-Predominated Transactions, 37 FORDHAM L. REv.
115 (1968). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010 (1968).
27. Cases cited note 12 supra.
28. 439 Pa. 501, 507, 267 A.2d 867, 870 (1970).
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guably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service, and
then employ this transformed material in erecting the
framework of a major policy decision.' Russell v. Commun-
ity Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966) .29
As another reason why the Perlmutter decision should not
dictate the outcome of the appeal, the court pointed to the long
established judicial policy in Pennsylvania of extending warranties
to non-sales situations.3 0 In other words, the court made it quite
clear that even if the lower court on remand should determine that
the furnishing of blood for transfusions is a service 3' (as did the
Perlmutter court) and not a sale, this fact, in and of itself, could
not automatically mean that the Hospital had not breached an im-
plied warranty 2 since Pennsylvania has long recognized the exis-
tence of warranties in service transactions.
33
As a cautionary postscript to its general discussion of the
presence of implied warranties in service transactions, the court
warns that though such devices may be available, before they can
actually be held applicable to a specific fact situation there first
must be "sufficient inquiry as to whether the policies for which
warranties are implied in law would be furthered by their impli-
cation in this situation."3 4  The attempts of the various courts
and commentators to resolve such perplexing policy questions
have made the entire area of blood transfusion litigation a fertile
subject for examination.
3 5
Basically, the policy questions which the trial court on remand
29. Id.
30. 439 Pa. at 506, 267 A.2d at 870 (1970).
31. See generally Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850 (1959).
32. See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
33. The court cited the following cases: Com v. Hunsberger, 224 Pa.
154, 73 A. 324 (1909) (bailment for hire); Shannon v. Boggs & Buhl, 124 Pa.
Super. 1, 187 A. 313 (1936) (bailment lease) ; Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v.
Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 A. 95 (1935) (lease of personal property);
White Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. 315 (1929) (bailment lease); Crown
Printing Co. v. Charles Beck Co., 73 Pa. Super. 419 (1920) (bailment lease);
Dufort v. Smith, 37 Luz. Leg. Reg. 315, 53 Pa. D. & C. 307 (C.P. 1944) (bail-
ment for hire). Contra, York Heating Co. v. Flannery, 87 Pa. Super. 19
(1926) (construction agreement). The court, citing UimFoRm COMMECIAL
CODF, Comment 2 to § 2-313, stated that the fact that all the cited cases
were decided under the UNIFORM SALES ACT does not affect their binding
authority: 439 Pa. at 507, 267 A.2d at 870. For a good discussion of the
area, though in a non-Pennsylvania case, see Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leas-
ing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (bailment for hire).
34. 439 Pa. 501, 508, 267 A.2d 867, 871 (1970).
35. Cases and other materials cited notes 10, 12 and 24 supra.
will have to answer are two-fold. The first will be to determine
which of the two non-culpable parties should bear the loss. 6 Should
the patient who is harmed or killed by the serum hepatitis virus
transmitted to him in the transfused blood and who was in no
way responsible for what occurred be left to suffer the conse-
quences? 7 Or should the Hospital that is performing a valuable,
necessary and charitable function be penalized for a result due not
to its negligence but instead to a non-detectable virus in the blood
it furnished to a patient? 8 In earlier years such a consideration
would have been resolved in favor of the hospital on the basis of
the doctrine of charitable immunity.s 9 However, with this doc-
trine clearly on the wane throughout the United States,40 courts
recently have been forced to make the no longer predetermined
decision on which party the liability should be placed. Many au-
thorities assert that most jurisdictions faced with the decision have
chosen to re-establish the cloak of immunity around the hospitals
41
and have done so through the strawman device of Perlmutter's
sales-service dichotomy.
4 2
36. The policy issue was aptly stated in 18 ORLA. L. REv. 104, 109
(1965):
The blood transfusion cases appear to encounter a conflict be-
tween the social interest in the safety of the individual and the
interest of the individual hospital which would appear to incur a
heavy burden from the imposition of implied warranty or strict lia-
bility.
37. Support for this position is found in the cases cited note 25
supra, and in Haut and Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 557 (1969); Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DicK. L. REv. 201
(1969); Comment, A New Principle of Products Liability in Service Trans-
actions, 30 U. PiT. L. REv. 508 (1969).
38. Support for this position is found in Farnsworth, Implied Warran-
ties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957); Garibaldi,
A New Look at Hospitals' Liability for Hepatitis-Contaminated Blood on
Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48 Cmi. BAR REc. 204 (1967); 38 FORDHAM
L. REv. 831 (1970); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 565 (1962); 18 OKLA. L. REV. 104
(1965); 29 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 305 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1955).
39. Gile v. Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d
662 (1956), is an example of a blood transfusion case decided on the basis
of charitable immunity.
40. Pennsylvania no longer recognizes the immunity of charitable in-
stitutions from liability for their torts: Nolan v. Tifereth Israel Syna-
gogue, 425 Pa. 106, 227 A.2d 675 (1967). However, the Hoffman opinion
points out that "We express no opinion at this time, however, whether
any such immunity should exist to causes of action based on the con-
tractual warranties here in issue.... .439 Pa. at 510, 267 A.2d at 871
(1970).
41. Such judicial protection of a hospital is clearly exhibited in Dib-
blee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d
1085 (1961).
42. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 II. App.
2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 39 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1970);
Newmark v. Gimble's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968); Perl-
mutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (dissenting
opinion); Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospitals' Liability for Hepatitis-Con-




The other policy question left unanswered by the decision and
which will have to be resolved on remand is whether the fact that
there is no known way to detect with 100% effectiveness the serum
hepatitis virus before the blood is transfused should be a factor
in determining the hospital's liability for breach of an implied war-
rarity.43 Logically, such a consideration would seem to be germane
only if the cause of action was based on negligence (i.e., if there
is no test that the hospital could use, then it could not be deemed
negligent in not detecting the virus).44 However, several courts
have flatly stated that the fact of the impossibility of detection pre-
empts the possibility that the hospital or the blood bank may be
held strictly liable in either tort or for breach of implied war-
ranty.45 It is submitted that such a perversion of strict liability
43. Several years ago it was believed that a reliable means of de-
tecting the virus had been discovered, see, e.g., Test Detects Hepatitis Virus
in Blood Samples, MEDICAL WORLD NEws (Sept. 25, 1964) (cited in the Hoff-
man opinion), however, the current medical opinion is that there are no
tests more than 50-90% reliable although there have been some promising
recent developments, see A .Test for Hepatitis-But Not for Au-Antigen,
MEDICAL WORLD NEWS (Nov. 27, 1970); 14 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS Hepatitis
§ 33 (1970 Supp.).
44. The following excerpt supports this position. The case involved a
suit for breach of implied warranty by a farmer against a vendor that had
sold him diseased chickens resulting in the death of all his chickens.
The vendor's experts testified that there was no way of determining
whether newly hatched chicks have leukosis and that there is no medica-
tion available to prevent the disease from occurring. The United States
Circuit Court of Appeals in questioning the relevancy of such testimony
stated:
The fact that avian leukosis is nondetectable could be an im-
portant issue but only as bearing on the charge of negligence
which is no longer in this suit .... The entire purpose behind the
implied warranty sections of the Code is to hold the seller respon-
sible when inferior goods are passed along to the unsuspecting
buyer. What the Code requires is not evidence that the defects
should or could have been uncovered by the seller but only that
the goods upon delivery were not of a merchantable quality or fit
for their particular purpose. If those requisite proofs are estab-
lished the only exculpatory relief afforded by the Code is a showing
that the implied warranties were modified or excluded by spe-
cific language under Section 2-316. Lack of skill or foresight on the
part of the seller in discovering the product's flaw was never meant
to bar liability. The gravamen here is not so much with what
precautions were taken by the seller but rather with the quality of
the goods contracted for by the buyer.
Vlases v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 377 F.2d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1967)
(applying Pa. law) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Carter
v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1969); Community
Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1967) (special con-
curring opinion); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 39 U.S.L.W.
2200, 2201 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1970).
45. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967); Balkowitsch v.
Minnesota War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805
(1965); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
principles is merely another judicial attempt to cushion charitable
organizatons from the financial shock of strict liability.
Because the policy questions discussed above should be re-
solved only after a complete inquiry has been made at the trial,
the Supreme Court, in order not to prematurely restrict that
inquiry, added two further caveats:
We do not decide that the extent of the warranties im-
plied at common law in non-sales situations need neces-
sarily be the same as those given statutory sanction in
sales transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code.
...Nor do we decide that all types of sales transactions
in all situations necessarily give rise to warranties of
the same extent.. ..46
By the use of such cautious phraseology, the court has left
every possible option open to the lower court. In other words,
the lower court can find that the transaction between patient and
Hospital involved either a sale or a service but, regardless of
which, that the implied warranties did not attach in this parti-
cular instance since their application is sometimes not uniform.
Other possible issues were noted by the court but were neither
resolved nor even discussed due to the early stage of the proceed-
ings from which this appeal was taken. The first of these involves
the question of whether the Hospital could assert assumption of
risk or break in the chain of proximate causation as defenses to
plaintiff's claim of breach of implied warranty. 47 Though such
defenses are almost exclusively thought of in terms of tort law, the
close relationship between the two concepts has prompted several
jurisdictions to allow the defenses to be raised to an implied war-
ranty cause of action, although there is authority to the contrary. 48
Pennsylvania has never decided the issue but one case has held
that plaintiff's contributory negligence could not be asserted in
defense against a cause of action in implied warranty.
49
Another issue noted but not decided by the court was the
question of whether there is any duty on the part of the Hospital
or doctor to warn the patient of the possibility that serum hepatitis
virus may be present in the blood about to be transfused. 0 While
again Pennsylvania has never decided this specific question, the
court cites authority which would support either an affirmative
or a negative answer.51
A very brief dissent was filed by Chief Justice Bell in which
he expressed disagreement "with a number of factual statements
46. 439 Pa. 501, 508-09, 267 A.2d 867, 871 (1970) (citations and foot-
notes omitted).
47. Id. at 510, 267 A.2d at 871 (1970).
48. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
49. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
50. 439 Pa. at 509, 267 A.2d at 871 (1970).
51. 439 Pa. at 509 n.14, 267 A.2d at 871 n.14 (1970).
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as well as legal principles and conclusions of law set forth in the
Majority Opinion"52 and also in which he expressed his continued
disagreement with the abolition of charitable immunity in Penn-
sylvania.5 3
THOMAS E. SCHWARTZ
52. Id. at 510, 267A.2dat872 (1970).
53. Id.
EQUAL PROTECTION-AN INDIGENT CANNOT
BE IMPRISONED FOR HIS INABILITY
TO PAY A FINE
Tate v. Short, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971)
In re Antazo, 3 Cal.3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court has recently held, in
Tate v. Short,1 that it is unconstitutional ". . . to limit punish-
ment to payment of a fine ... *"2 and then to imprison an indigent
person who is unable to pay the fine. The California Supreme
Court had previously ruled, in In re Antazo,3 that a person cannot
be imprisoned because of his inability to pay a fine imposed upon
him, if his inability to pay is due solely to his indigency. The
two cases can be distinguished, although, as will be discussed
later,4 it is submitted that neither Court would have intended such a
distinction.
Preston Tate, petitioner in Tate v. Short,5 was convicted of
nine traffic offenses and accumulated fines of $425. The court which
convicted him had no power to impose prison sentences for these
convictions.6 Tate, however, was unable to pay the fines 7 and was
sentenced to jail for a sufficient time to pay the fine at the rate
of five dollars for each day served. Tate's petition for relief in
habeas corpus was denied, and the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals affirmed, saying, "We overrule appellant's contention that
because he is too poor to pay the fines his imprisonment is uncon-
stitutional."" The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying
Tate was denied equal protection as required by the fourteenth
1. 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
2. Tate v. Short, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971) (syllabus).
3. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
4. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text infra.
5. 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
6. See TF x. CODE CRM. PROC. ANN. art. 414 (1966), which provides,
inter alia:
The corporation court in each incorporated city . . . shall have
jurisdiction . . . in all criminal cases arising under the criminal
laws of this State, in which punishment is by fine only....
7. Tate's failure to pay the fines was obviously due to his indi-
gency. He had a wife and two children dependent on him for support, and
he had an income of approximately $275 per month. Tate v. Short, 91 S.
Ct. 668, 669 n.1 (1971).
8. 445 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969).
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amendment since he was ". subjected to imprisonment solely
because of his indigency." 9
The Tate opinion cites Williams v. Illinois" as the major au-
thority for its reasoning. The petitioner in. Williams was sen-
tenced to imprisonment for the maximum period authorized by
the statute and he was also sentenced to pay a fine. Because of
his indigency, Williams was unable to pay the fine, so he was sen-
tenced to an additional term of imprisonment. On. appeal, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that it is a denial of equal
protertion to imprison a person for his inability to pay a fine be-
yond the maximum time fixed by the statute regulating the
crime of which he had been convicted." The Williams opinion
said that "the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment
... be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic
status."12
The Tate opinion did not need to go any further than the
holding in Williams. Tate's imprisonment obviously extended be-
yond the "statutory ceiling," as the Texas Statute did not author-
ize any imprisonment at all for traffic offenses."3 The Court did
break new ground in Tate, however, by quoting with approval from
an opinion concurring in the disposition of Morris v. Schoonfield:
14
... the same constitutional defect condemned in Williams
also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make im-
mediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is ac-
companied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term
extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed.
15
The Tate opinion ruled that the above quote is "... the view...
which we now adopt .. ."1 As indicated, this view is merely
dicta as regards the ruling on the facts in Tate. However, by the
force of this dicta, it is now unconstitutional to imprison a person
because of his inability to pay a fine, if his inability to pay is due
solely to his indigency.
Before the Supreme Court opinion in Tate v. Short,1" the Cali-
9. 91 S.Ct. 668 at 670 (1971).
10. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
11. Id. at 242.
12. Id. at 244.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
15. Id. at 509. Quoted in Tate v. Short, 91 S.Ct. 668, 671 (1971).
16. 91 S.Ct. 668, 670 (1971).
17. 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
fornia Supreme Court, in its decision in In re Antazo,18 had ruled
that it was a denial of equal protection to imprison an indigent for
his inability to pay a fine, even if the imprisonment did not extend
beyond the statutory maximum for the crime. In the California
case, Steven Clausman and Simeon Antazo were both charged
with arson, 19 arson of insured personal property,20 and conspiracy
to commit such offenses.21 Clausman pleaded not guilty and was
subsequently convicted at trial; Antazo pleaded guilty and was a
prosecution witness at Clausman's trial. The two were both sen-
tenced to a suspended sentence of three years and, as a condition
for their release on probation, a fine of $2500 and a penalty as-
sessment of $625. Clausman paid his fine and penalty assessment
and was released. Antazo was unable to make payment 2 and
was subsequently sentenced to be jailed one day for each $10 un-
paid. Antazo then brought a writ of habeas corpus, contending
his imprisonment in such manner violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The California Supreme
Court agreed with petitioner's contention, holding that his impri-
sonment ". . . constitutes an invidious discrimination on the basis
of wealth in violation of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
28
The Antazo opinion was without precedent at the time and
cities no direct authority for its holding; rather it relies on a test,
devised by the court, to determine the constitutional validity of a
statute challenged on the grounds of equal protection. Simply
stated, the test is as follows: once it has been shown that the
state has made a discrimination or classification that may be sus-
pected of violating the equal protection clause,
... the state bears the burden of establishing not only
that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but
that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to fur-
ther the purpose.
24
The California Supreme Court, relying on Williams v. Illinois,2 5
18. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 448a (West 1970).
20. CAL. PENiL CoD, § 450a (West 1970).
21. CAL. PENAL CODs, § 182(1) (West 1970).
22. Antazo's inability to pay was obviously because of his indi-
gency. He was represented by a public defender throughout the proceed-
ings, and the sentencing judge had been told that Antazo would have to
serve in jail any fine imposed upon him. See In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100,
105, 473 P.2d 999, 1002, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (1970).
23. Id. at 102, 473 P.2d at 1000, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
24. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01,
87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852 (1970) (emphasis in original). This is cited with ap-
proval in In 'e Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 120, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 261 (1970). See also Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 20 (1970) (applying this strict test to a literacy requirement for
voting).
25. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). See discussion of this case at text accompany-
ing notes 10-12 supra.
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found such a "suspect classification" in Antazo, namely "... an
example of discrimination between different groups or classifica-
tions of convicted criminal defendants-those who are poor and
those who are not. . *"26 So the question becomes, has the state
a "... compelling interest ... 27 to make such a classification, and
is the classification ". . . necessary to further its purpose .... -21
The Antazo court assumed, without discussion and seemingly
without deciding the point, that the state does have an interest in
the collection of fines, to the extent that it relates to the defen-
dant's rehabilitation. 29 But the court rejected the state's conten-
tion that such a discriminatory classification ". . is necessary to
promote the state's interest in collection of fines."80  The subse-
quent language in Tate v. Short31 lends support to this rejection:
"Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further any penal
objective of the State.
'3 2
The California Supreme Court gave two reasons for this re-
jection. First, the threat of being jailed can hardly be said to in-
fluence a person to pay a fine when it is absolutely impossible for
him to pay the fine. As former Justice Goldberg has said, "[t] he
'choice' of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really
no choice at all to the person who cannot raise $100."38 The An-
tazo court said, ". . . we fail to see how either the threat or the
actuality of imprisonment can force a man who is without funds,
to pay a fine."'' 4 Thus, jailing an indigent for nonpayment of a
fine does not really further the state's interest in collection of the
fine.
8 5
The California Supreme Court further found, as its second
reason for ruling that imprisonment is not necessary to collect fines,
26. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 111, 473 P.2d 999, 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 262 (1970).
27. Id. at 120, 473 P.2d at 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 122, 473 P.2d at 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
30. Id.
31. 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
32. Id. at 671.
33. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
205, 221 (1964).
34. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 124, 473 P.2d 999, 1007, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 264 (1970).
35. See Tate v. Short, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971); where, speaking of impris-
onment for nonpayment of a fine, the Court said:
It is imposed to augment the State's revenues but obviously does
not serve that purpose; the defendant can't pay because he is indi-
gent and his imprisonment, rather than aid collection of the
revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing
hi. . . .
91 S.Ct. at 671.
that there are alternative methods by which the state can collect
fines.A6 The Tate opinion also placed heavy emphasis on these
alternative means to which the state can resort. Both courts
quoted with approval the Supreme Court ruling in Williams v.
Illinois,"T where, speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
said:
It is unnecessary for us to canvass the numerous al-
ternatives to which the state by legislative enactment-or
judges within the scope of their authority-may resort in
order to avoid imprisoning an indigent beyond the statu-
tory maximum for involuntary nonpayment of a fine.
as
The United States Supreme Court in Williams ruled that the al-
ternatives must be utilized before an indigent can be imprisoned
for a longer period of time than that fixed by the statute regulating
the crime. But the Antazo decision goes further, saying that
such alternatives must be utilized before any imprisonment of an
indigent for nonpayment of a fine can be constitutionally ordered.
The Tate opinion seems to agree with Antazo, although its facts
justify a holding no broader than Williams. Thus, by virtue of
these court decisions, many state legislatures have been forced to
provide their courts with alternative sentencing procedures for
indigents who may not be alble to immediately pay a fine im-
posed upon them.
It must be noted at this point that neither Tate nor Antazo
ruled that it is always unconstitutional to imprison an indigent
for his nonpayment of a fine. The Supreme Court in Tate said:
Nor is our decision to be understood as precluding impri-
sonment as an enforcement method when alternative
means are unsuccessful despite the defendant's reason-
able efforts to satisfy the fines by those means.. .. 9
And the California Supreme Court in Antazo has said:
36. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 125, 473 P.2d 999, 1008, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 264 (1970).
37. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
38. Id. at 244. Cited in Tate v. Short, 91 S.Ct. 668, 671 (1971); and
cited in In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 125, 473 P.2d 999, 1008, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 264 (1970).
For examples of such alternatives, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205
(West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332(c) (Supp. 1968) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 38, § 4(a) (2) (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 1A (1959);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1075 (1959); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 470-d(1) (b)
(McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.92.070 (1961); A.B.A. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDuRES, § 2.7(b), 117-23 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968); A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (1) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
See generally, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, at 18 (1967);
Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor, 57 CAL. L. REV. 778, 810-19 (1969);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for
Nonpayment of Fines, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938, 945 (1966).
39. 91 S.Ct. 668, 672 (1971).
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When the indigent offender refuses to avail himself of
such alternatives . .. , or defaults or otherwise fails to meet
the conditions of the particular alternative . . . without
. . . reasonable excuse, the indigent offender becomes . . .
exactly the same as the contumacious offender who is not
indigent ... 40
In other words, a sentencing court must take notice of economic
conditions existing outside the courtroom but only to a reasonable
extent. Or, more precisely, equal protection must be reasonably
provided.
The Antazo opinion relies heavily on Griffin v. Illinois4 1 and
Douglas v. California.42 The Court in Griffin said: "There can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has. ' 43 And the Douglas opinion said
that ". . . there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal
a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has' [citation
omitted] .,44 It seems strange that the equal protection at trial issue
in Griffin and the equal protection at appeal issue in Douglas
were resolved before the equal protection at conviction issue as
raised by Antazo and Tate.4 5 It is submitted that trial and appeal
are but means to an end; whether and to what degree a penal
sanction should be imposed. Thus, a guarantee of equal protec-
tion at trial and at appeal is meaningless if the sanction can be
imposed without any regard for the equal protection argument.
In other words, if the doctrine in Griffin and Douglas is to have
effect at all, the Tate-Antazo doctrine must become firmly es-
tablished and, possibly, extended.
Is an extension of this doctrine possible? One eminent au-
thority argues that it is:
The gradual development of the principle of equality is,
therefore, a providential fact. It has all the characteristics
of such a fact: it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly
eludes all human interference, and all events as well as
all men contribute to its progress.
46
ROBERT W. BARTON
40. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 126, 473 P.2d 999, 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 265 (1970).
41. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
43. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
44. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
45. See generally, for an analysis of the development of equal pro-
tection in criminal procedure and a possible explanation as to why the de-
velopment has been such as herein suggested, Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1177-80 (1969).




Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
In the Fall of 1969, the Oswego Community High School
adopted a dress code for its students.1 The code had been recom-
mended by a committee composed of students and faculty mem-
bers. The School Board, in its ratification of the dress code, con-
cluded that long hair on male students was a disruptive influence
in the classroom. 2 The Board made copies of the code available to
the student body; and the school held a special convocation of
all students in order to explain the code requirements to the stu-
dents.3
Thirty-three male students appeared at school in violation of
the dress code. They were immediately sent home by the princi-
pal with directions to conform to the code.4 The next day, thir-
ty-one of the students returned to school in compliance with the
code provisions.5 Plaintiffs are the two high school students who
refuse to comply with the hair regulations.
Plaintiffs sought equitable and declaratory relief and dam-
ages, charging violation of their rights under the first, fourth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
1. See Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 3, 4 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
The dress code contained the following requirement:
Cleanliness and good grooming should be the rule for boys'
hair styles. Hair must be tapered in back and on the sides or, if
worn long, must not hang over the top of the collars and must be
groomed so that it will not cover any part of the ears. Length of
the hair on the forehead is limited to eyebrow level. Sideburns,
neat and trimmed, may not extend below the ear lobe. All boys
will be clean shaven.
Id. at 3, 4. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to "dress code," or
"code" or "hair regulations" in this Note refers to that portion of school
regulations which restricts the length of a male student's hair. Although
the factual situations of the decisions discussed in this Note involve stu-
dents with long hair, it appears certain that the principles enunciated will
apply to factual situations involving students with any type of extreme
hair style, long or short.
2. Id. at 3. "The Board also determined that the wearing of a girl-
style hair-do by boys was in fact a disruptive influence and interfered
with order in the classroom." Id.





tion.6 Plaintiffs had sought a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing the school authorities from enforcing the code.7 However,
the school authorities, defendants, readmitted plaintiffs pending a
final decision, provided that plaintiffs would pin back their hair
so as to not exceed the limitations set forth in the code.8 The de-
fendants offered expert testimony to justify their adoption of a
dress code.9 Held: Cause dismissed.10
The court reasoned that the federal courts should be hesitant
to interefere with the management and enforcement of discipline
in the schools.11 There is an affirmative duty on the part of the
School Board to adopt and enforce rules to encourage discipline
and to promote a favorable classroom climate.' 2 Since the dress
code was applied equally to all students,3 was equally enforced,
1 4
and was not arbitrary in defining a class to which it applied,'5 the
code was "... fair and reasonable, specific enough to be under-
stood, and justified. .. .
Enforcement of the dress code did not restrict plaintiffs'
freedom of speech and expression under the first amendment.'
7
6. Id. at 2. The students, both minors, each had the action brought
by his own father and next friend.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. The court determined that the school authorities were willing
to agree to the temporary arrangement because it made it easier for the
teachers to distinguish plaintiffs from female students. The experts did not
discuss this effect of the hair code.
9. Id. at 6. The four experts produced by defendants each had
many years of experience in teaching and in administrative capacities in
education. The experts testified that they were of the opinion that dress
and grooming corresponds to good behavior and discipline in the class-
room. Such testimony went unchallenged by plaintiffs.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
12. Id. at 7. The court interpreted the basis for this duty from ILL.
Rtv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-20.1-10.20.5, 10-22.6(a), 24-24, 26.1, 26.2 (Supp.
1971). Section 24-24 reads, in part, as follows:
Teachers and other certificated educational employees shall
maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating to the
discipline in and conduct of the schools and school children, they
stand in relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This
relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the
school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety
and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or
guardians.
Nothing in this Section affects the power of the board to es-
tablish rules with respect to discipline.





Each plaintiff insisted that he wore his hair long because he "liked
it that way."18 Thus, the court concluded:
[S] chool boards have the power to adopt and enforce
reasonable dress regulations that meet the needs of the
schools and conform to social custom. This is just what
the Oswego School Board and authorities did. 9
The court emphasized that, since the dress code was reasonable,
the court should uphold it so as not to impose upon the state of Illi-
nois the court's view of what is or what is not a wise economic and
social policy. 0
School boards are empowered to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules for management and government of its school affairs. 21 Yet
such rules must be justified; and the school boards may not act
arbitrarily. 22 It is well-settled that school officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students.23
The leading anti-hair 24 decision is Ferrell v. Dallas Indepen-
dent School District.25 In Ferrell, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 707 (W.D. Wis.), ajj'd,
419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1836 (1970)
(striking down dress code); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D. Me.
1970) (upholding dress code); Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (M.D.
Ala. 1969) (striking down dress code). See generally Goldstein, The Scope
and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and
Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 384 (1969).
22. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1968) (upheld right of students to wear armbands
protesting the Vietnam war):
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of total-
itarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the State must respect, just as they must re-
spect their obligations to the State.
Id. at 512. Accord, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969).
23. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
24. For purposes of this Note, any reference to "anti-hair" decisions
indicates courts which hold against the students' freedom of hair style;
any reference to "pro-hair" decisions indicates courts which hold for the
students' freedom of hair style.
25. 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). Ferrell is indicated as a "leading" case
because almost every anti-hair decision favorably refers to it. For other
anti-hair decisions, see Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970);
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 408
F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1968); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970);
Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(moustaches); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education, 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.
Ga. 1969) (moustaches); Brick v. Board of Education, 305 F. Supp. 1316
(D. Colo. 1969); Crews v. Clanco, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969);
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peals affirmed a district court decision that the dress code was
constitutional. 26 The plaintiffs in Ferrell, three students, com-
plained that the code interfered with performance of their occupa-
tion as rock and roll musicians.
27
The Ferrell court did not hold that a hair style is a constitu-
tionally protected right.28 Rather, the court reasoned that even if
the right to freedom of hairstyle was a constitutional right, the
state would still be permitted to infringe upon such right.2 9 The
court based its decision on the need for the state to run an "ef-
fective and efficient" school system. 0 Presumably, although the
court did not face the issue squarely, hair regulations are essential
to an "effective and efficient" school system.3
1
The Ferrell decision was followed in Stevenson v. Wheeler
County Board of Education.32 In Stevenson, the dress code pro-
hibited mustaches; 38 the court stressed the need for allowing more
discretion on the part of school officials in their promotion of disci-
pline in the school.84 The plaintiffs here were blacks and claimed
that there were "racial overtones" in the school dress code policy;86
Fitzpatrick v. Garrison, Civil No. 2050 (W.D. Ky. May 5, 1970). See also
Haskell, Judicial Review of School Discipline, 21 CASE WES. L. REV. 29, 38
(1970).
26. 392 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. 392 F.2d at 698. A portion of the contract between the students
and their business manager reads:
It is further understood and agreed between Agent and Princi-
ple [sic] that Principle [sic] and each member of Principles [sic]
organization [sic] shall maintain their dress and personnal [sic]
appearance in conformity with accepted standards and customs of
rock and roll groups, combo's and bands including so-called Beatle
type hair styles.
Id. at 698 n.2 (1968).
28. Id. at 702.
29. The court stated:
The Constitution does not establish an absolute right to free
expression of ideas .... The constitutional right to free exercise
of speech, press, assembly, and religion may be infringed by the
state if there are compelling reasons to do so.
Id. at 702, 703.
30. Id. at 703.
31. 392 F.2d at 704 (concurring opinion).
32. 306 F. Supp. 97, 100 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
33. Id. at 99.
34. Id. at 101. The court stressed the need for allowing school au-
thorities considerable leeway in promulgating rules pertaining to disci-
pline in the classroom: "I have no intention of becoming a tonsorial or
sartorial consultant of boards, superintendents and principals. Except in
extreme cases the judgment of school officials should be final in applying a
regulation to an individual case. Id.
35. Id. at 99. The plaintiffs claimed that their wearing of mustaches
was symbolic for them and other black youths of their masculinity.
but the court dismissed this contention and based its decision up-
holding the dress code on the importance of good grooming to the
educational process.30
Proponents of a student's right to freedom of hair style were
encouraged by the decision of Richards v. Thurston.3 7 Although
there were no specific regulations restricting hair style, the court
discussed the issue of whether a student in a public high school
has the right to freedom of hair style.8 8 The court held that a
student's freedom of hair style is a "personal liberty; '39 a state
interest which justifies an intrusion into such personal liberty must
be "self-evident or be affirmatively shown.
°40
The scope of the Richards decision was expanded in Laine v.
Dittman.41 In Laine, there was evidence that disruptions did
in fact occur.42 Yet, the court held that where long hair on a stu-
dent disturbs only a small percentage of other students, the school
is not justified in adopting and enforcing dress codes. 43 Although
the Laine court stated that freedom of hair style is not unlimited,
44
the court apparently required a showing that disturbances, occur-
ring as a result of long hair, must affect a significant portion of
the student body before a dress code can be justified.
36. Id. "School officials testified that any unusual diversion from the
norm has a diverting influence on the student body." Id.
37. 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). For other pro-hair cases see Breen
v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411
(D. Vt. 1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Alff v. E.
Side Union High School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Meyers v.
Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d
189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
38. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 1285. "We conclude that within the commodious concept of
liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one's
hair as he wishes." Id.
40. Id. at 1286. The court did recognize that there may be situa-
tions where an inherent, self-evident, justification for restricting hair
styles will prevail over the personal liberty of freedom of hair styles.
But the school authorities have the burden of establishing such justifica-
tion.
41. 125 Ill. App. 2d 178, 259 N.E.2d 824 (1970).
42. Id. at 181, 259 N.E.2d at 827 (petitions were circulated; several
students whistled at plaintiff).
43. Id. at 181, 259 N.E.2d at 827.
44. Id. at 181, 259 N.E.2d at 827. Cf. Yoo v. Moynihan, 28 Conn. Supp.
375, 262 A.2d 814 (1969). In Yoo, the court held that freedom of hair style
is protected by the right of privacy and is apparently unlimited.
The hair style of a person falls within the right of privacy
which protects his beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations, and
the board of education has no legal ground to proscribe the hair
style of a pupil when the board interferes with his right to self-
expression in the styling of his hair. His right to style his hair as
he pleases falls within the penumbra of the constitution which
protects his right of privacy and his right to be free from intrusion
by the government.
Id. at 376, 262 A.2d at 816 (1969). Accord, Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp.




The anti-hair courts do not hold that the school authorities
have an absolute right to curtail freedom of hair style. 45 Con-
versely, the pro-hair courts do not hold that freedom of hair style
is unlimited. 46 The central issue is whether the school authorities
have justified their adoption and enforcement of dress codes. 7 An
anti-hair court is more likely to find justification for a code on
evidence of a mere threat of future disturbances; 48 a pro-hair court
is more likely to require evidence that actual disturbances did in
fact occur. Such disturbances must affect a significant portion of
the student body before the pro-hair court will find "justification"
for the code.
4 9
Livingston v. Swanquist5" is well within the range of anti-hair
decisions which uphold dress codes on evidence of a mere threat of
future disturbances.5 1 In Livingston, the school authorities pro-
duced expert teastimony to establish that ". . . there is a direct
correlation between dress and grooming and good behaviour, dis-
cipline and a teaching climate in the classroom....1,2
It is submitted that a justification of dress codes based on an-
ticipated disturbances, as in Livingston, reaches the apex of illogic.
In apparent seriousness, the School Board maintained that hair
regulations were needed so that teachers could distinguish boys
from girls in order to prevent a "malicious-minded boy" from en-
tering the girls' washroom.53 Nowhere in the record does it appear
that any such incident had in fact occurred, or was likely to occur.
The danger of upholding dress codes on the threat of anticipated
disturbances is that school boards can more readily impose their
45. See cases cited note 25 supra.
46. See cases cited note 37 supra.
47. See, e.g., Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
48. Id. at 8.
49. See, e.g., Laine v. Dittman, 125 Ill. App. 2d 178, 259 N.E.2d 824,
827 (1970).
50. 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
51. Id. at 6. Accord, Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310
F. Supp. 579, 587 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
52. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
53. Id. at 3. Livingston is not alone in its use of illogic in order to
find justification for the code. See, e.g., Brownlee v. Bradley County,
Tenn. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970):
[S]uffice it to say that long hair on males is contrary to long
established practice in the United States and, in the present state of
taste, style, and culture, is offensive to many people....
Id. at 1367. Apparently, the Brownlee court believes that a minority view-
point is not entitled to respect. The better policy is that of Dunham v.
Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970): ". . . It would be a bit frightening
if a naked emphasis on conformity were to prevail in our public schools.
." Id. at 420.
tastes and attitudes upon the student population by adopting dress
codes under the justification of the "anticipated disturbance or
distraction" theory.
54
In a perceptive response to the "disturbance-distraction"
theory advanced by anti-hair courts, the majority, in Breen v.
Kahl,"5 queried:
Is it a desirable objective of our public schools to elimi-
nate diversity within the school in order to eliminate
distraction? On the contrary, is it not more vital to
encourage experience with diversity and adaptation to it,
in a diverse nation and world, than to encourage homo-
geneity ?56
The Court, in Yoo v. Moynihan, 7 expressly recognized that
disruption of school procedures will occur as a result of the reac-
tions of other students to the plaintiff's hair style.18 Yet the court
refused to allow the board of education to prohibit long hair.5 9
The Livingston court reasoned, relying on the plaintiffs' own
testimony, that they did not wear their hair long for political,
social or religious reasons.60 The court concluded that plaintiffs
wore their hair long because they "like it that way."61 It is not
clear in Livingston whether a dress code would be upheld if the
student claimed long hair to be a means of expressing "political,
social or religious" beliefs.1
2
54. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969). The
following are excerpts from a deposition by a principal of a public high
school:
'[E]xtreme hair styling' on boys especially 'symbolizes some-
thing that I feel is not in the best interests of good citizenship'; that'whenever I see a long-hair youngster he is usually leading a riot,
he has gotten through committing a crime, he is a dope addict or
some such thing'; that 'anyone who wears abnormally long hair, to
the decent citizenry, immediately reflects a symbol that we feel is
trying to disrupt everything we are trying to build up [sic] and by
we I mean God-fearing Americans'.
296 F. Supp. at 705 n.3.
55. Id. at 702.
56. Id. at 709.
57. 28 Conn. Supp. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (1969).
58. Id. at 377, 262 A.2d at 816.
59. The court approved the following quote from Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1968):
[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any de-
parture from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person, may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk. ...
28 Conn. Supp. at 377, 262 A.2d at 816, citing 393 U.S. at 508.
60. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. The language of the court seems to indicate that once the
Board satisfies the court that there is justification for the code, then even if
a constitutional right were involved the code would be upheld.
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The court, in Livingston, conceded that "[The plaintiffs' moti-
vation] . ..was a personal choice as to hair dress. . . ."6 But
rather than face the issue of whether the right to privacy is in-
volved, 64 the court reasoned that because the hair style was a
personal choice, it is not an expression of freedom of speech. Living-
ston adds little to the issue of whether freedom of hair style is en-
titled to the same degree of protection as that granted first amend-
ment rights such as free speech.65
The school authorities, in Livingston, stressed the need for a
dress code in order for teachers to maintain discipline within the
classroom. 66 By accepting such reasoning, 7 the Livingston deci-
sion joins other anti-hair courts68 in giving carte blanche authority
to school boards.69 The better reasoning appears in the pro-hair
holding in Breen v. Kahl:70
[T]o uphold arbitrary school rules which 'sharply
implicate basic constitutional values' for the sake of some
nebulous concept of school discipline is contrary to the
principle that we are a government of laws which are
passed pursuant to the United States Constitution.7 1
63. Id.
64. Pro-hair courts have recognized that hair style involves a right of
privacy. See, e.g., quote from Yoo note 44 supra. See also Dunham v. Pulsi-
fer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 418 (D. Vt. 1970): "[T]here are few individual
characteristics more basic to one's personality and image than the manner
in which one wears his hair .... 
65. There has not yet been a determination by the Supreme Court as
to whether freedom of hair style is entitled to first amendment protection.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1968): "The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regula-
tion of the length of skirts or to the type of clothing, to hair style ......
Id. at 509. Anti-hair courts have been inclined to focus on this statement to
give credence to the argument that the Supreme Court does not intend
freedom of hair style to be given first amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tenn. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1365
(E.D. Tenn. 1970).
66. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See
also, Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579, 587 (W.D.
Pa. 1970).
67. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970): "[D]e-
fendants have shown a school dress code is an aid in maintaining good
order in the school and a proper teaching climate." Id. at 6.
68. See cases cited note 25, supra.
69. Cf. Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969):
[B]ut the students who are subjected to these regulations do
not vote in school board elections; political redress of their griev-
ances is not open to them; theirs is a situation in which judicial
vindication of constitutional protections has been considered par-
ticularly appropriate ...
Id. at 708.
70. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
71. Id. at 1037.
Livingston further attempted to justify hair regulations by
analogizing the alleged authority of the school board to regulate
hair style to the authority of the school board to require students
to wear clothing to school. 72 That is, the court focused on the
ludicrous example of a fifteen year old boy who appeared nude at
school. 73 Since it is clearly reasonable for the school board to
require clothing on students, then it is reasonable for the school
board to restrict hair style.74 Such logic was refuted in Dunham
v. Pulsifer.
75
In Dunham, the school had adopted a grooming code which
restricted the length of hair of any student who participated in
athletics.76 The court held that the right to freedom of hair style
is a fundamental right.77 In response to the contention of the
school authorities that they could require clothing on students and
therefore should be able to restrict the length of hair of students,
the court stated:
[T]he cut of one's hair style is more fundamental to
personal appearance than the type of clothing he wears.
Garments can be changed at will whereas hair, once it is
cut, has to remain constant for substantial periods of
tim e . .. 78
A unique approach to the question of a student's right to free-
dom of hair style was advanced in Brownlee v. Bradley County,
Tenn. B. of Educ.79 In Brownlee, the court held that aesthetic con-
siderations are justification enough for adoption and enforcement of
a dress code:8 0
In these days of growing environmental concern any court
denying that aesthetic considerations may form the basis
for public regulation would doubtless find itself swim-
ming against the current in very murky legal waters.8 1
Query whether aesthetic considerations should justify regulation
of personal appearance as distinguished from regulation of prop-
erty (e.g., zoning regulations).
It is submitted that Livingston permits school authorities to
72. 314 F. Supp. 1, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
76. Id. at 414.
77. Id. at 418.
78. Id. at 419. Contra, Shows v. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63 (Miss. Sup.
Ct. 1969):
[A]Ithough a rule of this type may affect the private lives of
students outside as well as in school, this was not an improper
invasion of family privacy, which must give way to the rights and
the interests of the community, teachers, and other students in an
adequately disciplined and efficient school system. . ..
Id. at 64.
79. 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
80. Id. at 1366.
81. Id. at 1367.
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impose their own social values on the students. 82 Livingston ac-
cepts the basic premise, offered by the school authorities, that
variations in physical appearance can cause disruptions in the
classroom; therefore, such variations must be eliminated.8 1 What,
then, will be the fate of children with congenital defects or physi-
cal handicaps? Would it not be a better policy to expose students
to diverse opinions, attitudes and appearances?
The trend in Livingston must be reversed. The words of Mr.
Justice Douglas, in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,
84
eloquently appeal for the need to encourage individuality in the
classroom:
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the States
are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person
can be denied education in a public school because of the
length of his hair. I suppose that a nation bent on turning
out robots might insist that every male have a crew cut
and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of 'life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,' expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, later found specific defini-
tion in the Constitution itself, including of course free-
dom of expression on a wide zone of privacy. I had sup-
posed those guarantees permitted idiosyncracies to flourish,
especially when they concern the image of one's personal-




82. See note 54 supra.
83. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. IIl. 1970).
84. 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
85. Id. at 856.
CRIMINAL LAW-PRESUMPTION THAT
UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN
GOODS IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF GUILT
OF RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 230 (1970).
In Commonwealth v. Owens,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held constitutionally infirm the rule that possession of recently
stolen goods raises a presumption of defendant's knowledge that the
goods had been stolen. Though the court purported to limit its
holding to the circumstances of the instant case, its language is
broad enough to cover other fact situations and criminal presump-
tions.
The defendant Owens was convicted of receiving stolen goods.
2
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth showed that three
handguns were stolen from an automobile. Less than three weeks
later, a police officer searching premises owned by one Harris
found one of the stolen guns. Harris stated, and later testified, that
he bought the gun from the defendant. His testimony was cor-
roborated by his wife. The defendant denied having any connec-
tion with the stolen guns. The court noted that, assuming the trier
of fact believed the prosecution's witnesses, the Commonwealth
proved only the theft and the defendant's possession. Thus, the
presumption of guilty knowledge arising from the defendant's pos-
session was the basis on which the conviction rested.
3
The Commonwealth must prove three essential elements to con-
vict a defendant of receiving stolen goods: (1) that the goods were
stolen; (2) that the defendant possessed them; and, (3) that the
defendant received them knowing or having reasonable cause to
know the goods were stolen.4 After the Commonwealth has shown
1. 441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 230 (1970).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4817 (1961):
Whoever buys, has, or receives any goods, chattels, money or
securities, or any other matter or thing, which shall have been
stolen or feloniously taken, either in this Commonwealth or in any
other state or country, knowing, or having reasonable cause to
know the same to have been stolen or feloniously. taken, is guilty
of a felony, and on conviction shall be imprisoned not exceeding
five (5) years or fined not exceeding one thousand ($1,000), or
both.
3. Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 322, 271 A.2d 230, 232 (1970).
4. Commonwealth v. Leo, 188 Pa. Super. 36, 145 A.2d 925 (1958);
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that the goods were stolen and found in the defendant's possession,
it must sustain the more difficult burden of proving that the defend-
ant knew the goods were stolen.' To aid the Commonwealth in sus-
taining this burden, the Pennsylvania courts have held that the
defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is evi-
dence that the possessor had knowledge of the felonious taking.6
The inference of guilt arising from the unexplained possession of
recently stolen goods has also been used to sustain convictions of
larceny7 and murder"
The courts have interchangably called the rule a presumption
of fact and an inference, disregarding any technical distinction
between the terms.9 Whichever term is used, however, the courts
have said that it is for the trier of fact to draw the inference in
light of all the circumstances shown.' 0  In Commonwealth ex rel.
Chatary v. Nailon,1 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
It is equally well established that unexplained possession
in the defendant of property recently stolen is evidence that
he is the thief .... Also, if the indictment charges receiving
stolen goods only, the unexplained possession is evidence of
Commonwealth v. Roth, 169 Pa. Super. 88, 82 A.2d 710 (1951); Common-
wealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946). B. LAUB, PENNSYL-
VANIA TRIAL GUIDE § 484 (1959).
5. Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 179 Pa. Super. 247, 116 A.2d 316
(1955); Commonwealth v. Chester, 77 Pa. Super. 388 (1921); Commonwealth
v. Dattala, 77 Pa. Super. 320 (1921).
6 Commonwealth ex rel. Chatary v. Nailon, 416 Pa. 280, 206 A.2d 43
(1965); Commonwealth v. Gomori, 192 Pa. Super. 325, 161 A.2d 649 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Pittman, 179 Pa. Super. 645, 118 A.2d 214 (1955); Com-
monwealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Chester, 77 Pa. Super. 388 (1921); Commonwealth v. Dattala, 77 Pa.
Super. 320 (1921). For other jurisdictions accepting the presumption, see
People v. Williams, 253 Cal. App. 2d 952, 61 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1967); Buckley
v. State, 2 Md. App. 508, 235 A.2d 754 (1967); State v. Boykin, 285 Minn.
276, 172 N.W.2d 754 (1969); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99
(1969) (statutory presumption constitutional); People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d
496, 297 N.Y.S.2d 578, 245 N.E.2d 226 (1969). But see State v. Woods, 434
S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1968); Payne v. State, 435 P.2d 424 (Okla. Crim. App.
1968) (statutory presumption unconstitutional); State v. Long, 243 Ore. 561,
415 P.2d 171 (1966); Pollen v. State, 247 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
See also 1 WHARTON, CRIMNAL EvmENcE § 135 (12th ed. 1955); 76 C.J.S.
Receiving Stolen Goods § 17(b) (1964).
7. Commonwealth v. Dock, 146 Pa. Super. 16, 21 A.2d 429 (1941).
8. Commonwealth v. Newman, 276 Pa. 534, 120 A. 474 (1923).
9. 'B. LAuB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE § 110 (1959) (explaining the
technical distinction).
10. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946);
Commonwealth v. Dock, 146 Pa. Super. 16, 21 A.2d 429 (1941); Common-
wealth v. Chester, 77 Pa. Super. 388 (1921).
11. 416 Pa. 280, 206 A.2d 43 (1965).
guilt of that crime .... It is for the trier of fact alone to say
whether the guilt of the defendant is a reasonable inference,
fairly deducible from his possession of recently stolen prop-
erty, in light of all the circumstances, including the rea-
sonableness of his explanation, if any, as to how he came
into possession.
12
Thus, the trier of fact is not required to draw the inference, but may
do so if it is a logical inference in light of all the circumstances.
For the inference to sustain a conviction, the possession must
be of recently stolen goods. Whether the possession is recent is a
question for the trier of fact and depends on the nature of the pro-
perty and the circumstances of the case.13
While the courts have maintained that the Commonwealth bears
the burden of proving the essential elements of the crime, they have
also said that the presumption of knowledge places on the defendant
the duty or burden of explaining his possession to the satisfaction
of the judge or jury.14 However, this duty has not been construed
to mean the defendant must establish a reasonable explanation at
his peril." The defendant's lack of explanation does not require the
trier of fact to draw the inference; the trier must still be convinced
by the evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'6 While it has
been argued that the presumption of knowledge is a violation of the
accused's privilege against self-incrimination, 17 the Pennsylvania
appellate courts have not construed it as an adverse comment on
the accused's failure to take the stand since the explanation could
come from documents or other witnesses."' The Owens court did
not consider the self-incrimination argument.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Leary v. United
States'9 and Turner v. United States20 in finding the presumption
unconstitutional. In Leary, the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a section of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export
Act 2' which provided that unexplained possession of marijuana
should be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction of the
12. Id. at 283, 206 A.2d at 45.
13. Commonwealth v. Dattala, 77 Pa. Super. 320 (1921); Common-
wealth v. Berney, 28 Pa. Super. 58 (1905).
14. Commonwealth v. Pittman, 179 Pa. Super. 645, 118 A.2d 214 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 179 Pa. Super. 247, 116 A.2d 316 (1955).
15. Commonwealth v. Dock, 146 Pa. Super. 16, 21 A.2d 429 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Dattala, 77 Pa. Super. 320 (1921).
16. Commonwealth v. Dattala, 77 Pa. Super. 320 (1921).
17. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 403 (1970); Due Proc-
ess, Self-Incrimination, and Statutory Presumptions in the Wake of Leary
and Turner, 61 J. CRavi. L. C. & P. S. 367 (1970). Contra, McKay v. United
States, 263 A.2d 645 (D.C. App. 1970).
18. Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 179 Pa. Super. 247, 116 A.2d 316
(1955).
19. 395 U.S. 6 (1969) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Leary].
20. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
21. 21 U.S.C.A. § 176(a) (1961).
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crime of knowingly transporting and concealing marijuana known
to have been illegally imported.2 2 The Leary Court, quoting Tot v.
United States,23 said:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be
sustained if there is no rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of
the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack
of connection between the two in common experience.
24
The Court, futher interpreting the Tot test, held that a criminal
statutory presumption must be regarded as irrational or arbitrary
unless it could be said with substantial assurance that the presumed
fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which
it is made to depend.25 After surveying the available data concern-
ing the amount of marihuana illegally imported and the manner by
which marihauna users might gain knowledge of its importation,
the Court held that the statutory presumption of knowledge did not
meet the "more likely than not" test and was, therefore, unconstitu-
tional. Thus, mere possession of marihauna would not be sufficient
proof that the possessor knew it was illegally imported.
In Turner v. United States, 26 the United States Supreme Court
held a similar statutory presumption27 valid as applied to heroin, but
constitutionally invalid as applied to cocaine. Examining the em-
pirical data, the Court found that all heroin (with the possible ex-
ception of one per cent) consumed in the United States is illegally
imported and that this fact is widely known, especially by those who
traffic in it "unless they practice a studied ignorance to which they
are not entitled."28 However, since more cocaine is lawfully pro-
duced in this country than is smuggled into it, the Court held the
statutory presumption of knowledge of illegal importation invalid.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the Leary "more
likely than not" test to the knowledge presumption as it was used
22. 21 U.S.C.A. § 176(a) (1961):
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant
is shown to have or to have had the marihuana in his possession,
such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction unless the defendant explains his possession to the sat-
isfaction of the jury.
23. 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).
24. 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969).
25. Id. at 36.
26. 396 U.S. 398 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Tur-
ner].
27. 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 (1961).
28. 396 U.S. at 417.
against the defendant in Owens. A staff report of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence supplied the
empirical data from which the court determined the rationality of
the presumption as applied to handguns. The report estimated that
fifty-four per cent of all handguns acquired in 1968 were sold used.
Among low income groups, seventy-one per cent of the used fire-
arms were obtained from friends or private parties.29 The court
concluded:
While these figures do not enable us to construct with any
degree of accuracy the relative percentages of transfers of
stolen and nonstolen guns, they nevertheless do indicate the
probability that substantial numbers of used guns are
transferred in seemingly innocent circumstances. 80
The court noted that many possibilities exist for acquiring posses-
sion innocently: gifts, payments for services rendered or for debts,
and purchases from a seemingly reputable dealer in used guns.
Relying on Turner, the court held that the fact that the defendant's
possession is unexplained does not enhance the Commonwealth's
position:
* . . If the Government proves only possession and if pos-
session is itself insufficient evidence of either importation
or knowledge, but the statute nevertheless permits convic-
tion where the defendant chooses not to explain, the Go-
ernment is clearly relieved of its obligation to prove its
case, unaided by the defendant .... 31
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the presumption of
knowledge unconstitutional as applied to the instant circumstances,
the method used by the court would seem to have a much broader
application than the circumstances in Owens. If, as the court said,
a criminal presumption is unconstitutional unless the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact, presumptions
other than that used in Owens may be subject to attack. The ques-
tion of whether the challenger of the presumption must supply the
data to prove its invalidity or whether the Commonwealth must
supply sufficient data to sustain it is not answered by the decision.
However, the court admits that the challenger may have the burden
of showing the statutory presumption to be constitutionally infirm.
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In his dissent, Mr. Chief Justice Bell distinguished the Leary
and Turner decisions on the grounds that those cases concerned the
statutory presumption of knowledge of illegal drug importation.
Although he does not further explain his basis for the distinction,
the implication is that in Leary and Turner the presumption goes
29. Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 324, 271 A.2d 230, 233 (1970).
30. Id. at 324-25, 271 A.2d at 233.
31. Id. at 325, 271 A.2d at 233, quoting Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 408 n.8 (1970) (emphasis added by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court).
32. Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 326, 271 A.2d 230, 234 (1970).
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not only to knowledge of illegal importation but also the fact of
illegal importation itself. The presumption of knowledge in receiv-
ing stolen goods would go only to knowledge that the goods were
stolen. Since the Commonwealth must prove that the goods were
stolen, there would be no presumption to that effect. However, the
Court in Leary and Turner was more concerned with the state of
the defendant's knowledge, with the incidence of illegal importation
being a factor in determining the probability of a possessor's know-
ing his drugs were illegally imported. Although it can be argued
that a jury would give a statutory presumption greater weight than
it would give a judicially created one, the Owens majority apparent-
ly did not consider that any constitutional distinctions should be
made between presumptions created statutorily and judicially.
Under the Owens decision, the Commonwealth no longer has
the benefit of the presumption of knowledge in a prosecution for
receiving stolen goods. Mere possession will no longer support a
conviction. However, if the Commonwealth introduces evidence of
other suspicious circumstances, the trier of fact is still free to draw
logical inferences from that evidence to find the defendant guilty.
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